Derrida’s Right to Philosophy, Then and Now
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With Derrida’s substantial legacy having been the subject over the last few years of conferences, colloquia, and journal issues in a number of fields, it may well fall to professors of education to eulogize this philosopher’s considerable efforts to expand what he referred to as “a space for philosophy teaching and for philosophical research.”¹ During the 1970s and 1980s, Derrida led a particularly French and philosophical form of the extension movement in higher education, very much part of a tradition that some of us would recognize as following from the “democratic dons” of Oxbridge in Victorian England who spoke to packed halls in Mechanics Institutes and Co-operative Societies. Derrida also sought to extend the teaching of philosophy in French high schools so that it might be introduced earlier in a student’s education. His efforts at educational outreach were closely linked to another form of extension, as he relentlessly pushed philosophy into new fields, questions, and not so much new methods but different stylistics of inquiry. Certainly, Derrida’s educational efforts may strike some as lacking the force, originality, and impact of his philosophical writings taken as a whole. Yet the distinction between educational and philosophical work is not entirely a fair one, as educational concerns often figured in his philosophical writing.² In particular, Derrida’s commitment to philosophy as both a source of education and scholarship came together in his very powerful sense of a right to philosophy.³

In this Educational Theory symposium on Derrida, I want to consider his efforts to advance this right, principally through his seldom-recognized role as an education activist, as

² Derrida himself may seem to overstate it when he states in an interview from 2000, “The question of teaching runs through all my work and all my politico-institutional engagements, whether they concern schools, the university, or the media”; cited by Denise Egéa-Kuehne, “The Teaching of Philosophy: Renewed Rights and Responsibilities,” Educational Philosophy and Theory 35, no. 3 (2003): 275.
³ The work that Derrida has done directly on educational themes and that has been translated into English are collected in two volumes: Jacques Derrida, Who’s Afraid of Philosophy? The Right to Philosophy I, trans. Jan Plug and others (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002) and Eyes of the University, Right to Philosophy II, trans. Jan Plug and others (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004).
well as his celebrated and sometimes vilified stance as a philosopher of deconstruction. This right to philosophy formed the basis of new educational institutions even as it represented a rather challenging theory of education that plays on concepts of access and accessibility. At least among adults, if not high school students, Derrida labored to increase access to an education in philosophy by stepping in front of an interested public and doing philosophy, in medias res. This is an educational theory of right and access, and not one of mediated, developmental or graduated levels of instruction and assessment. To further demonstrate this educational principle, and the continuing relevance of his work on this theme, I in the final section of the paper apply Derrida’s right to philosophy to the Internet’s impact on access to research and scholarship. For here, we are seemingly in need of principled counsel, given that online access to philosophy and scholarly work generally seems at once so educationally promising and so forbidding today. That is, some philosophers, as well as scholars in other fields, are making sure that scholarly articles and whole journals – as well as classic texts and encyclopedias of philosophy – are freely available online, while the vast majority of their colleagues may little mind to these developments, ensuring that most scholarly work remains the purview of those with privileged access to well-endowed research libraries. Thus, my interest in seeing Derrida’s educational project brought forward, in its own right (to philosophy) and as it might be furthered through, and contribute to, today’s parallel right to knowledge movement, better known as open access initiative. After all, open access to research and scholarship has become the stuff in recent years of newspaper headlines, as university faculty and research funders are coming to feel that a new right to research and scholarship has arrived with the rise of this digital age.

Access and accessibility were critical educational and philosophical issues for Derrida, and highly controversial ones. He was often held up as the paradigm of postmodern inaccessibility, right up to the public notice of his death in the New York Times’ less-than-

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5 By way of those headlines and the stories behind them, see Patricia Cohen, “At Harvard, a Proposal to Publish Free on Web,” New York Times (February 12, 2008) on motion passed by Harvard’s Faculty of Arts and Sciences requiring faculty to archive a freely available copy of all published work; and on the National Institutes of Health requirement that researchers deposit a freely available “open access” copy of their funded publications in an archive, see Rick Weiss, “Measure Would Require Free Access To Results of NIH-Funded Research,” Washington Post (December 21, 2007), A33.
generous obituary, “Jacques Derrida, Abstruse Theorist, Dies at 74.”6 This attitude toward Derrida – I hesitate to call in a critique – brings this educational principle of accessibility to the point of academic freedom. It was only as Derrida attracted large audiences and a considerable readership, for a philosopher, that his accessibility became a public issue (compared to the vastly technical work of many philosophers).7 But it was also his very program, if you will, to defend the freedom of public expression or public right to philosophy in its most difficult, experimental and sometimes flawed form, as it was being thought through and worked out in public settings, sounding much like contemporary classical music in the ears of those who feel strongly that this form of music ended with the premature death of Mozart.

The Philosopher as Education Activist

To briefly review Derrida’s educational extension and outreach efforts during the 1970s and 1980s, he was among those who formed the Groupe de Recherches pour l’Enseignement de la Philosophie (Greph) in 1975, an organization that fought to preserve and extend the teaching of philosophy in French high schools. As Derrida was to describe the work of Greph in 1980, “since 1975 it has brought together a large number of teachers and students, whether philosophers or not, determined to question themselves about the philosophical institution, its history and current functioning, but also to intervene in it by posting new questions and behaving differently within it.”8 It was a group concerned with research that has “both a critical and practical bearing,” as well as the practical, material questions of philosophy teaching, such as the number of hours given to classes in philosophy, the “places of work,” and the number of teaching jobs for philosophers, as well as the range of critical questions that philosophy brought to its own practice and that of the society at large.9

6 Jonathan Kandell, “Jacques Derrida, Abstruse Theorist, Dies at 74,” New York Times, October 10, 2004. The notice includes such lines as “Mr. Derrida was a prolific writer, but his 40-plus books on various aspects of deconstruction were no more easily accessible.”
8 Jacques Derrida, “‘Who’s Afraid of Philosophy?’” (1980), in Eyes of the University, 187-188.
9 Derrida, “Sendeoffs (for the Collège International de Philosophie) (1982),” in Eyes of the University, 246, 249.
Derrida was also one of the conveners of the États Généraux de la Philosophie in June of 1979 at the Sorbonne, which brought together over a thousand philosophers, teachers, and students from across France “who believed in the necessity of philosophical research and debate in our society,” in Derrida’s words. The focus of the Estates General was decidedly one of extending the reach of philosophy, as Derrida reiterated in his initial address to this assembly, calling for “the extension of the teaching of philosophy… extension with all of its consequences, which are not limited to philosophy or even to education… this last demand – extension – is legitimate, vital, decisive.” Derrida also emphasized how the theme of openness was critical to this pedagogical project by pointing out how, by the end of the 1970s “the material and technical conditions of teaching are improved and more open,” while adding that “to struggle for that [openness] is already to take a stand – and to do so philosophically.” In 1981, François Mitterand, who was to be elected president of France later that same year, issued a statement during his campaign that seemed to build on this new philosophical interest, as it affirmed that, indeed, philosophy “is a critical discipline that should better allow everyone to understand the world and their place in it in order to live and act in that world,” while also supporting the teaching of philosophy in secondary schools.

In 1983, Derrida then participated in establishing the state-funded but autonomous Collège International de Philosophie, which took the form of an open university dedicated to expanding access to the teaching of philosophy, as well as undertaking new forms of philosophical inquiry. Elected as its first director, Derrida saw the Collège International de Philosophie as a response to “an awakening of the philosophical or a return to philosophy” that was taking place within the larger society, as he put it in the proposal for the Collège, a return which “greatly exceeds academic limits and all the traditional places reserved for philosophical exchange and research.” The excess of such “counter-institutions,” as Derrida refers to it (and

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10 Derrida, “Who’s Afraid of Philosophy,” 185. The Estates General was a legislative assembly of the different classes in the Ancien Régime.
13 Derrida, “Letter from François Mitterand to Greph,” in Eyes of the University, 194.
14 The Collège International de Philosophie does not charge or set out prerequisites for its courses, research programs, colloquia and lectures which take place at the intersection of philosophy and sciences, art, literature, politics and psychology.
15 Derrida, “Titles (for the Collège International de Philosophie) (1982),” in Eyes of the University, 196 (original emphasis). In “Why the Collège International de Philosophie Is a Nuisance,” Pascal Engel puts this openness in these terms: “Since there are no entrance exams, nor degrees, the public is free to come as they wish, on the model
one may think, as well, of counter-programs and counter-journals) turns these spaces into bastions of academic freedom that embrace the prospect of gaining the wherewithal collectively to reform these academic limits.\textsuperscript{16} In this case, as Derrida describes it in a “sendoff” he wrote for the college, this academic excess was also intended to address new telecommunication technologies which might be used to address “the crisis and the future of publishing in general, and of scientific, philosophical, or literary publishing in particular.”\textsuperscript{17} This publishing theme, which in the early 1980s already entailed “new techniques of archiving and distribution,” in Derrida’s words, was something to be studied around questions of “the technical and political problems of the culture of the book.”\textsuperscript{18} The Collège, he argued, should be seeking ways of providing access to these new “technical possibilities (public and private),” pointing toward possibilities of open access publishing that I will return to below, in terms of the extensions for philosophy that are being realized today.\textsuperscript{19}

It is true that Derrida’s focus with the Collège International de Philosophie was as much on establishing a place that, in his eyes, would “open up to forms of knowledge, research, and philosophical practice that seem to us insufficiently legitimized, even deligitimized by present institutions,” as it was on reaching and teaching the public.\textsuperscript{20} Yet Derrida’s interests were no less about expanding philosophy’s educational mandate: “Philosophy should be taught earlier than in this last grade of the high school, that is, earlier than at [a student's] sixteen or seventeen years … [and] there should be philosophy across the borders -- not only in philosophy proper, but in all fields such as law, medicine, so on and so forth.”\textsuperscript{21} This combination of concerns with what can be taught (and in relation to what fields) and to whom it can be taught represents a bold defense of philosophy’s place, intellectually and educationally, that brings together themes of academic

\textsuperscript{17} Derrida, “Sendoffs,” 239.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{20} Derrida, “Popularities: On the Right to the Philosophy of Right” in \textit{Eyes of the University}, 175.
\textsuperscript{21} Derrida, \textit{Roundtable Discussion}. 

of the Collège de France (indeed the CIP is a sort of poor-man’s Collège de France). It seems to be composed of a population similar to that which goes to the philosophy cafés, or various encounters that the French are fond of”;

freedom ("new problems, which had no legitimacy" in the universities) and public access
("philosophy should be taught earlier") that are vital to these less than philosophical times in
which we are all now teaching and testing.

Finally, in 1989, Derrida was appointed to a committee “to consider the contents of
teaching,” which was established by the Minister of National Education and chaired by Pierre
Bourdieu and François Gros. This group again brought together school teachers and university
faculty, and consulted with unions and professional organizations, with Derrida co-chairing the
Philosophy and Epistemology sub-committee with Jacques Bouveresse. The committee’s report
took on the most practical of educational issues, the need to reduce the pupil-teacher ratio in
philosophy classes, and it sought to establish, as the first of its “five fundamental points,” that
“philosophy should constitute an indispensable part of every coherent and structured program of
intellectual training.” The fifth point held that “all teachers of primary and secondary
education… should have the benefit, during their training, of instruction in philosophy,” which
was seen to be a “constructive and critical reflection on teaching itself.” While Derrida later
reported that “the government did not choose to follow our advice,” I think it safe to say that
since then at least that element of a “constructive and critical reflection” on one’s own teaching
has become a commonplace in teacher education programs and one of the standards in the
United States, at least, for teacher education accreditation. The degree to which, however, this
reflection is philosophical in nature and concerned with teaching itself remains an open question.

The infamously intricate and difficulty of Derrida’s work adds a political dimension to this
right to philosophy. For people were to have a right, as a result of Derrida’s educational efforts,
to take classes that did not simply follow the popularized journey through the Western
philosophy in the best-seller tradition of Will Durant’s story of philosophy, but a right of access
to what is new, critical, controversial and experimental in philosophy, to what is a philosophy of

24 Derrida, “Once Again from the Top,” 329. For example, see the NCATE Standards: an education faculty
member’s “teaching encourages candidates’ development of reflection, critical thinking, problem solving, and
professional dispositions”: Professional Standards: Accreditation of Schools, Colleges, and Departments of
Education (Washington, DC: National Council for the Accreditation of Teacher Education, 2006), 34,
law, science, and the state. Certainly, there are plenty of guides to Derrida and deconstruction, no less than for other philosophers and philosophies, and these economical and widely available guides contribute to the accessibility of philosophy in a highly commendable way.

Derrida was working toward an educational right to philosophy that entails seeing first-hand how philosophers do philosophy in ways that address what is most difficult, uncertain, and controversial about language and life. Derrida taught classes open to anyone at the Collège International de Philosophie, and held public lectures on critical philosophical issues. Perhaps the most notable of these public lectures was on March 14, 1987, when following Victor Faria’s book on Heidegger’s scandalous involvement with Nazism, Derrida spoke on Heidegger’s changing conception of spirit in ways that reflected on the German philosopher’s influence on his own work at the conference “Heidegger, questions ouvertes.” Whether Derrida’s stance toward Heidegger was or could ever be adequate – given that for Derrida the German philosopher will remain “for a long time to come … provocative, enigmatic, still to be read” – it is never for Derrida, as it was for Heidegger to turn away in silence, to keep from going public with what is difficult in a forthright way.

As Derrida has put it in response to the inevitable question on how “non-specialist readers” are supposed to make sense of his philosophy, that while “everything must be done to come close to… accessibility” (in the sense of readability), he insists that one should “never totally renounce the demands proper to the discipline” (which is vital, I would add, to academic freedom). And at the same time, Derrida held that “it should not be believed that there is on one side the ‘specialist reader’ and on the other side the ‘non-specialist reader.’ Derrida’s right to philosophy goes a step beyond that, establishing an important educational principle in the process.

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26 For example, Paul Strathern *Derrida in 90 Minutes: Philosophers in 90 Minutes* (New York: Ivan R Dec, 2000).


28 Jacques Derrida, *Points*, 182. This is to also invoke the silence of Paul de Man, and Derrida’s response to de Man’s second world war anti-Semitic newspaper columns when he was in his early 20s between 1940 and 1942; Jacques Derrida, “Like the Sound of the Sea Deep Within a Shell: Paul de Man War” *Memoires for Paul de Man* (Columbia University Press, 1989). His going public also carries with it a certain defensiveness and temptation to turn the tables: “What is the press [so quick to condemn De Man] in the culture and politics of this century”; 159.

The education principle at stake here concerns the quality and depth of the students’ engagement with the subject matter. Are they to see the world entirely through textbook-mediated eyes, with the material tailored to the average reading-grade level and public perception of what constitutes the subject. Or are they able, on occasion, to step beyond that disembodied overview and, if they are the least bit interested, experience first-hand aspects of what the philosopher does when she is doing philosophy? In this case, specialist and non-specialist students were to have opportunities to engage with unmediated philosophy, not as canned theories or a static body of thought, but as a current, sometimes experimental and sometimes contested approach to thinking. Yet Derrida’s considerable educational efforts to address the right to philosophy, as a right to what was philosophically difficult, have been seldom cited in the controversies over the seeming inaccessibility of his own work.

The Cartesian Point of Access
While taking on this public education role, Derrida was also crafting philosophic texts about the right to philosophy. There is in this work not only an concern with the openness and indeterminacy of meanings, although there is much of that, but he was also concerned with what I would call a literal openness to philosophy, if Derrida was not always addressing what could well be called the literal quality by which, for example, a text operates in relation to other texts: “This interweaving, this textile, is text produced only in the transformation of another text. Nothing, neither among the elements nor within the system, is anywhere ever simply present or absent. There are only everywhere, differences, and traces of traces.”30 This is not the place to consider analogous deconstructive themes of openness running across his work, although one can perhaps with even this single quote begin to see how measures that limit access to philosophy can interfere with the tracing of those traces. For if Derrida is himself everywhere transforming texts, he was also extremely attentive to philosophy’s practical historical efforts to expand the traces of philosophy that ran through the larger society. This was part of the more positive and certain concern with the right to philosophy, which is this paper’s educational theme.

In “If There Is Cause to Translate I: Philosophy in its National Language (Toward a ‘licterature en français’),” for example, Derrida focused on Descartes’ efforts to make his work available to a wider French audience. Derrida begins the essay with a quotation drawn from the conclusion of Descartes’ *Discourse on Method* (for Reasoning Well and for Seeking Truth in the Sciences) originally published in 1637. In the quotation, Descartes comments on his decision to write the book in French instead of the more common Latin when it came to scholarly works certainly: “And if I write in French, which is the language of my country, rather than in Latin, which is that of my teachers, it is because I hope that those who use only their pure natural reason will better judge my opinions than those who believe only in old books.” Descartes’ choice of French was part of an effort to recruit a broader range of French readers, enrolling them against his teachers, as it were, in the very heady days of early modern philosophy. It was not, then, that Descartes failed to see the value of reaching what was in effect the international scholarly community defined by Latin. Rather, Descartes’ decision to set philosophy on a new path was, in part, about making it more of a public enterprise. It was a break with the past that involved reaching out, more widely, to the present, while using that broader vantage point to continue to engage the scholarly community.

Derrida treats this public turn on Descartes’ part as a political-linguistic move. The prolific output of the printing press creating a much wider market for book, raised the status of vernacular languages through the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and as such was a critical aspect in the cultural and public formation of the modern state. To write in French language also had something of a more democratic or populist aspect to it, compared to works in Latin, or as Descartes put it, he “wished to be intelligible even to women while proving matter for the finest

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31 Jacques Derrida, “If There Is Cause to Translate I: Philosophy in its National Language (Toward a ‘licterature en français’)” in *Eyes of the University*, 1-19.
32 Jacques Derrida, “If There Is Cause to Translate I,” 1. It is worth comparing the 1960 Penguin Classics translation (as Penguin Classics were the great access-equalizers of the 1950s onward) in which French is referred to at the end of the paragraph, in this Arthur Wollaston translation as “language of the people” (*en langue vulgaire*) rather than “a vulgar tongue,” used by those involved in the translation of Derrida’s essay; Rene Descartes, *Discourse on Method*, Trans. Arthur Wollaston (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1960), 96.
33 At the time, Hobbes was writing in Latin and Descartes himself published the *Principia Philosophiae* in Latin in 1644 (which made perfect marketing sense, given Descartes wrote it as a textbook for the universities), with Newton responding, to a certain degree, with his Latin *Principia* in 1687. The *Discourse on Method* was translated into Latin by Etienne de Courcelle in 1644 with Descartes’ assistance, and the omission of the paragraph on Descartes’ choice to write in French. Descartes’ most famous philosophical line, which is drawn from the *Discourse on Method*, is remembered, of course, in its Latin version: *cogito ergo sum.*

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minds” and “in a manner that everyone can easily grasp.” Following on that, each person could be their own judge of what was true. So rather than accept the traditional authorities, “The first rule,” Descartes writes of his method, “was to accept as true nothing that I did not know to be evidently so.”

Though his personal motto – “The hidden life is best” – spoke to the philosopher’s reclusiveness, he felt the need to take the more public path in calling for a change in thinking about the sciences. In turn, Derrida’s efforts to extend the space for philosophy through the high school and university were also part of the post-war national expansion of a more highly educated workforce. Derrida’s point is that Descartes’ choice of French was not removed from history or its prime mover, politics, and this is no less true of his own work or ours. Yet at the same time, Descartes’ decision to write in the language of the people (though not a people that could universally read or, for that matter universally speak French at that time) forms its own response “to the problems of the democratization of education,” as Derrida said in relation to his 1989 commission report on philosophy and epistemology. Derrida’s writing on educational themes, as we have seen with his work on Descartes, plays out a political philosophy in its concerns with the power of the state, the ideas of the people, as part of a right to philosophy and the democracy to come, to use another of Derrida’s haunting phrases. Derrida’s stance on the politics of education was consistently on the side of the right to philosophy.

The Right to Philosophy Today

The interests which Derrida and Descartes shared in increasing access to philosophy, as both a right to philosophy and a means of putting philosophy to the test, have taken a new form in

34 Cited by Derrida, “Cause to Translate I,” 18, 25.
35 Descartes, *Discourse on Method*, 50. Similarly, Descartes questions his education (and educators): “For I found myself hampered by so many doubts and errors that the only benefit of my efforts to become an education person seemed to be the increasing discovery of my own ignorance”; *Discourse on Method*, 38.
37 Derrida, “Once Again from the Top,” 328.
recent years, as more and more scholarly work moves to the Internet. In looking at philosophy’s move online, I want to continue to treat philosophy as a set of ideas that drives thoughtful and somewhat risky work and that is at the same time, cognizant of this right to philosophy. As open and fluid as Derrida sought to keep his work, he, too, wanted that openness to be available to as many people as wanted to stop by for a class, a lecture, or a conference, so that they could, after the aspirations of Descartes, to decide for themselves what is true.

This is why is worth considering how, over the last decade, the right to philosophy could be said to have been considerable increased for high school students, faculty in universities in the developing world, and really for anyone who is interested but do not have access to a well-stocked research library. The Directory of Open Access Journals list close to 80 journals in philosophy, from Animus to William James Studies, that make their entire contents freely available online. Many journals offer a form of open access some months after publication; and still other journals, including those from the majority of commercial publishers, are granting their authors permission to post published work in open access archives. Combine that, in the case of philosophy, with the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, which provides a rigorously reviewed guide to the field, the countless sites devoted to work by and on leading philosophers, the full-texts of classic philosophical works available through Project Gutenberg, MIT’s OpenCourseWare syllabi (with 70 courses citing philosophy as part of their project), and Wikipedia, which offers a people’s history of ideas, and one finds that the Internet offers it own equivalent of an open university, an international college of philosophy, that is readily accessible through the Internet.

These various efforts signal the emergence of an open access movement for research and scholarship, and it represents a commitment to increasing access to knowledge that follows in the tradition of nineteenth-century mechanics institutes, public libraries, cheap editions, and extension lectures. Much as the early coffee houses, dating back to the seventeenth century,
were deemed “penny universities” (as they offered customers ready access to newspapers and magazines), the Internet café has come to assume a similar role.

Nowhere is the impact of these new rights being felt more strongly that in the universities of developing countries, where enrolment is growing even as resources are scarce. The right to philosophy, in the sense of being able participate in the literature, is highly dependent, after all, on having access to it. Despite a considerable digital divide – with a shortage of computers, expensive prices for bandwidth and the regular occurrence of power outages – the open access movement has proved to be a boon to scholars and students working in these universities. It is not that everyone has access to the Internet, by any means, but only that print had reached its limits in fostering a global knowledge exchange. Access to print journals and books in the research libraries of the developing world has been in a state of collapse for some time, after getting off to a very modest start in the period following the success of the independence movements of the 1960s, due to price increases and currency fluctuations of the 1980s and 1990s. Through generous arrangements with publishers online access, the University of Ghana-Legon is now able to offer 20,000 journals to students and faculty, I learned on a recent visit, even that access is from a limited numbers of terminals, with the country suffering at the time rotating electrical blackouts.

As well, the new publishing technologies that make open access publishing feasible also create opportunities for new journals to be launched online that are then immediately available to readers through search engines and thus have a far greater presence in the global exchange of knowledge than could be achieved by having to first sell subscriptions, unless one is backed by one of the major journal publishing interests.41 And the ability to start journals where few or none have existed, whether in a geopolitical sense or in terms of new paradigms and forms of inquiry, is surely part of what academic freedom is about.

While at this point perhaps as much as 20 percent of the literature published each year is open, it is making a difference to the global circulation of research and scholarship, dramatically

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41 For example, the Public Knowledge Project (http://pkp.sfu.ca), which I direct, produces open source (free) software to support the management and publishing of peer-reviewed online journals in cost-effective ways that have enabled hundreds of journals to offer open access to their contents.
so among universities in the developing world.\textsuperscript{42} It is not hard to see, then, how open access has a part to play in addressing, in Derrida’s words “the problems of the democratization of education.”\textsuperscript{43} Yet Derrida’s caution to us, arising from his reading of Descartes, is that we need to also see how the choice of a language (and publishing medium) is no less implicated in state formations and historical forces that would otherwise frustrate philosophers’ aspirations to critique and transcend the limits of existing structures and traditions.\textsuperscript{44} There is the hegemony of English today, as world language in academic circles, which Derrida sharply observed as part of the essay on Descartes by noting that it was “Latin before Descartes, American English today.”\textsuperscript{45} So, too, we need to follow Derrida in looking for the “juridicio-political” play where open access intersects with academic freedom, which I might introduce here with the help of the U. S. Department of Education’s What Works Clearing House.\textsuperscript{46}

The What Works Clearinghouse (WCC), funded by the U.S. Department of Education, commissioned a literature review from Alan H. Schoenfeld, a professor at the University of California at Berkeley, for a special issue of Research in Middle Level Education Online, which the WCC then cancelled, seemingly in light of his critiquing the WWC’s handling of mathematics education research.\textsuperscript{47} The government gave Schoenfeld the right to publish the paper elsewhere, which he did, along with a description of the WWC’s refusal to publish the essay, in the open access journal Educational Researcher.\textsuperscript{48} To go public with this work seems


\textsuperscript{43} Derrida, “Once Again from the Top,” 328.

\textsuperscript{44} Derrida also offers a caution on the scope of our aspirations for the Web: “It recreates the temptation that is figured by the World Wide Web as the ubiquitous Book finally reconstituted, the book of God, the great book of Nature, or the World Book finally achieved in its onto-theological dream, even though what it does is to repeat the end of that book to come”; “The Book to Come,” The Paper Machine, trans. Rachel Bowlby (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), 15.

\textsuperscript{45} Derrida, “If There Is Cause to Translate,” p. 5.

\textsuperscript{46} Derrida, “Cause to Translate I,” 5.

\textsuperscript{47} Alan H. Schoenfeld, “What Doesn’t Work: The Challenge and Failure of the What Works Clearinghouse to Conduct Meaningful Reviews of Studies of Mathematics Curricula,” Educational Researcher 35, no. 2 (2006): 19, http://www.aera.net/uploadedFiles/Publications/Journals/Educational_Researcher/3502/03ERv35n2_Schoenfeld.pdf. He suggests that there may have been concern, as well, over a paper by Jere Confrey which challenged, according to Schoenfeld, “the philosophical basis of the work and some of the technical decisions made by the WCC” (ibid.).

\textsuperscript{48} Although the distinction of its rights with regard to research grants and contracted work, which the WCC makes in its own defense is worth considering more seriously than Schoenfeld gives credit; See Rebecca Herman, Robert Boruch, Rebecca Powell, Steven Fleischman, and Rebecca Maynard, “Overcoming the Challenges: A Response to Alan H. Schoenfeld’s ‘What Doesn't Work,’” Educational Researcher 35, No. 2 (2006), 22-23,
the perfect counter to a government research agency that otherwise claims to be, as the What Works Clearinghouse boldly states on its website, “A trusted source of scientific evidence on what works in education.”

The academic freedom at issue here concerns not only the right to express Cartesian doubts over the government’s methods of handling research, but it also involves the far broader right to carry on forms of research and scholarship that fall outside the government agency’s definition of what research “works” for the advantage of education. That is, what counts as legitimate research is at issue. The legitimacy question was a factor in Derrida’s decision to become involved in establishing extra-curricular institutions and organizations in France. The Collège International de Philosophie, Derrida wrote, “would be open to types of research that are not perceived as legitimate today... providing a place to work on the value and meaning of the basic, the fundamental, on its opposition to end-orientation, on the ruses of end-orientation in all its domains.”49 The end-orientation, which we might take as achievement test-score gains in this case, has indeed become a ruse restricting the academic freedom of scholars, insofar as it devalues and de-legitimizes work outside, and critical of, that paradigm.50 It is not that all scholarly work is to be defended; rather all work must continually prove its value and contribution. While to study “the non-certification of a research project,” in Derrida’s terms, “is one of the tasks most indispensable to the exercise of academic responsibility, most urgent for the maintenance of [the university’s] dignity.”51

In the United States, the research-legitimacy issue in education has received its own form of legislative sanctioning, with the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001’s repeated references to “scientifically based research” as the necessary means for garnering support for program

http://www.aera.net/uploadedFiles/Publications/Journals/Educational_Researcher/3502/05ERv35n2_SchoenfeldRejoinder.pdf

49 Jacques Derrida, “The Principle of Reason: The University in the Eyes of its Pupils,” in Eyes of the University, 148. On the implications of this ends-orientation, see Peter Trifonas, “The Ethics of Science and/as Research: Deconstruction and the Orientations of a New Academic Responsibility,” Educational Philosophy and Theory 35, no. 3 (2003): “The transformation of research goals and purposes consumes the institution because the autonomy of its own self-regulating measures of knowledge advancement is sacrificed to the real-world pressures of simply securing a sustainable future for itself as an economically and politically viable institution of culture” (287).
50 Derrida defends forms of research “that would not be pledged in advance to some utilitarian purpose” but would be “shielded from power, inaccessible to programming by the agencies and instances of State… civil society or capital interests”; Derrida, “The Principle of Reason,” 141-142.
changes. In education’s current political climate, with the government behind the What Works Clearinghouse, the Institute of Education Sciences, and a legislative endorsement of scientifically based research, one might begin to worry about the once and future place of philosophical research and inquiry in education, or as Derrida bluntly puts it: “The moment a discourse, even if not forbidden, cannot find the conditions for an exposition or for an unlimited public discussion, one can speak of an effect of censorship, no matter how excessive this may seem.” Open access to research and scholarship provides a way forward, I argue, as it maintains the scholarly integrity and autonomy of this work, even as it ensures that it is available “for an unlimited public discussion,” or rather a not unduly or unnecessarily limited public discussion. That is, philosophers are in a position, at this point, to expand and extend the contribution of their scholarship to public discussion by making their work more available than it has been up to now.

Clearly, it would be naïve to think that finding ways of increasing access to the research and scholarship, in and of itself, will be a great guarantor of academic freedom, even as it extends the reach of, and right to, philosophy. Yet it needs to be said that the responsibilities of the scholar, in making their work public, are changing. I am not talking about anything as committed as Derrida in campaigning to extend the teaching of philosophy in the schools or joining in the founding of new institutions. Rather, with each work that is published, a new range of options have become available.

Take this journal, for example. It is published by Blackwell on behalf of its sponsors, the John Dewey Society and the Philosophy of Education Society. Although, it may take an author a moment or two to discover it, Blackwell Publishing has a well-defined policy enabling authors to post copies of their work in open access archives and their own websites, as it “recognizes the

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52 See Michael J. Feuer, Lisa Towne, and Richard J. Shavelson, “Scientific Culture and Educational Research,” Educational Researcher, 31, no. 8 (2002): 4-14. As well, in his critique of exclusivity of the “education sciences” and what-works approaches, Thomas A. Schwandt recommends that “educational researchers should join the political and public (not just the academic) conversation about the place of educational science in society and about how science is both implicated in and confronts the politics of what counts as knowledge… Those of us deeply worried about science-based and evidence-based approaches to research and practice need to make new kinds of appearances”; “A Diagnostic Reading Of Scientifically Based Research For Education” Education Theory, 55, no 3 (2005), 304-05.
53 Derrida, “Vacant Chair,” in Eyes of the University, Right to Philosophy II, trans. Jan Plug and others (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), 46, original emphasis.
54 Derrida identifies how for eight centuries the university has stood as “a sort of supplementary body that at one and the same time it wanted to project outside itself and to keep jealously to itself, to emancipate and control”; “The Principle of Reason,” 153-154.
importance of the Open Access debate for scholarly communications and its aim to deliver unrestricted access to academic research to all those who seek it.” Its self-archiving policy—which reflects what is now something of an industry standard, if a well-kept secret, within the publishing industry—enables authors to post their paper prior to review and to, following review, post the final draft submitted to the journal, with a link to the online published version for those who have library or personal access to *Educational Theory* on the Blackwell Synergy site. To test how this works, I invite you to enter the title of this article into Google Scholar, which will lead you to the published version on the Blackwell Synergy site, if you are a member of a subscribing research library, as well to a copy of my final refereed draft in an open access archive. The two versions may reflect differences, resulting perhaps from the publisher’s proof reading. This is always going to be a troubling point for a scholar, but given this current strategy among publishers of limiting authors to posting their final post-refereed draft to protect the value of their subscriptions, this is cost of making one’s work far more widely available to readers.

As for the benefits, studies are showing that work that is archived in this way, or published in open access journals, is being cited by other scholars more often than work that remains locked away in subscription journals alone. Open access is also increasing the public impact that journals have, whether you look at journalists and parents in the field of education, physicians and the public in health, or policymakers in government. And open access not only increases the rights for readers, as *Teachers College Record* discovered that its experiments with

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56 To review the archiving policies of close to 10,000 scholarly titles, see the SHERPA/RoMEO database, http://www.sherpa.ac.uk/romeo.php.
57 On researchers’ greater citation of work that has been made freely available, whether by the journal or the author (through an archive, with the publisher’s permission), compared to similar work that has not been made open access, see “The Effect of Open Access and Downloads (‘Hits’) on Citation Impact: A Bibliography of Studies,” OpCit Project, http://opcit.eprints.org/oacitation-biblio.html.
making articles open access six months after publication led to a considerable increase in submissions from authors.59

That said, it also needs to be noted that, as followed from Derrida’s public persona, there is a risk that when such work is made freely available to readers, it will all the more easily catch the eye of partisan forces opposed to the direction and implications of such work. Just so, Michael Apple has been excoriated in the editorial pages of the Wall Street Journal for his “unpatriotic” description of the “The Star-Spangled Banner” as a “strikingly militaristic song,” which this University of Wisconsin professor of educational policy wrote in what was an openly accessible piece in Teachers College Record.60 Now if the best defense of Apple’s academic freedom is to leave his work locked away behind a password, with access only for those with membership in research libraries alone – which I very much doubt would be his position on this matter – then the struggle for academic freedom, in one sense, is already lost.

A subscriber-only firewall defense of academic freedom will not, at any rate, prevent selective citing and slighting of this work by those determined to condemn hotbeds of liberal and socialist indoctrination within American universities. It only prevents the public from readily seeing that work as a whole, even as it cuts them off from learning what such work has to teach them about education. The academic freedom that needs to be asserted today follows on Descartes’ decision to seek a wider readership by writing the Discourse on Method in French and Derrida’s pursuit of new institutional forms for teaching and doing philosophy. It also follows on John Dewey’s involvement with the initial declaration on academic freedom (as well as his own

59 According to editor Gary J. Natriello (personal communication), Teachers College Record’s initial experiment with free content increased readership by a factor of 40 for some of the leading articles and increased submissions to the journal, enabling it to produce 10 issues a year, up from four. In addition, some 65,000 people signed up for email notification of the free content. Open access, after a six-month delay for each issue, did not affect Teachers College Record’s institutional subscriptions. See Blackwell Publishing’s Policy on Open Access (http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/static/openaccess.asp), a policy that this journal could do far more to publicize, including what is gained by author (and journal) by taking advantage of this policy.

60 “A Civics Lesson: A Few Questions You Should Ask your Child’s Social Studies Teacher,” Wall Street Journal (August 22, 2003), which via, in all likelihood, Chester E. Finn Jr.’s introduction to September 11: What Our Children Need to Know, a collection of conservative pieces (Washington, DC: Thomas B. Fordham Institute, 2002), http://www.edexcelence.net/institute/publication/publication.cfm?id=65, is citing Michael Apple, “Patriotism, Pedagogy, and Freedom: On the Educational Meanings of September 11th,” Teachers College Record, 104 (2002), 1764. At this point, the Wall Street Journal piece is freely available online, while Teachers College Record has changed its open access policy, and now charges $7 for the Apple piece, while still offering other works at no charge.
Involvement in reshaping education as a form of inquiry), in a point worth making, given the John Dewey Society’s role as one of the sponsors of this journal.\footnote{Dewey believed that the role of the American Association of University Professors was, according to Tierney and Lechuga, “to promote scholarship to the American public”; he had, as well, in the early 1890s been party to a wayward and unsuccessful scheme to publish \textit{Thought News}, a newspaper of ideas; William G. Tierney and Vicente M. Lechuga, “Academic Freedom in the 21st Century,” \textit{NEA Higher Education Journal}, Fall (2005), 9; Brian A Williams, “Thought and Action: John Dewey at the University of Michigan,” [Bentley Library] \textit{Bulletin} no. 44 (July 1998), http://www.soe.umich.edu/dewey/thoughtnews/index.html.}

In the early 1990s, Derrida made it clear that his work with Greph and the Collège International de Philosophie were responses to how “in all of our so-called industrial societies, the teaching and doing of philosophy are being threatened by the State and by a certain liberal logic of the marketplace.”\footnote{Derrida, \textit{Points}, 411-12. Also see Denise Egéa-Kuehne who makes a similar point in her discussion of Derrida, namely that “attacks on philosophy are still coming from both governmental institutions (e.g., drive for ‘efficiency’ and ‘accountability’) and techno-capitalist society (e.g., selective research funding).” She also cites a Derrida interview response to a question of access to philosophy teaching in 2002 in which he points out that while imagining a pedagogy for “corporate executives, policy makers, and especially politicians,” the exposure would indeed be worthwhile as “all the decisions … so-called ethical, theo-ethical, which must be taken today, questions of sovereignty, questions of international law, have been the objects of philosophical research for a very long time, and in a renewed fashion now”; “The Teaching of Philosophy,” 274, 275.} This distrust of the State and marketplace did not preclude working with the government to establish new education policies and kinds of institutions, in a way that distinguishes this philosopher as an education activist. Today, the Internet provides a new means for circulating ideas, and negotiating with state and marketplace for extending the teaching and doing of philosophy. At stake are advances in the right to philosophy, advances which need to seen as augmenting what print and traditional forms of schooling offer. Still, it is also a source of public knowledge ideas with an increasing reach into people’s lives, schools, libraries, workplaces and homes. In addition, there are signs everywhere that it is feeding a growing expectation among the public and professions that for any given issue the relevant knowledge, including research results, are found online.

So where does that leave philosophy’s contributions to educational issues and questions, especially in light of the growing presence of the United States government’s What Works Clearinghouse and related initiatives, such as the Strategic Educational Research Program?\footnote{John Willinsky, “The Strategic Education Research Program and the Public Value of Research,” \textit{Educational Researcher} 30, no. 1 (2001): 5-14.} As things stand, certain forms of education research are being made widely and freely available, in readily digestible formats and with the considerable endorsement of state agencies, and these works are not particularly philosophical in interest, scope, or method: “A State power or the forces that it represents no longer need to prohibit research or to censor discourse, especially in
the West,” is how Derrida puts it, “it is enough that they can limit the means, can regulate support for production, transmission, diffusion.”64 The “machinery for this new ‘censorship,’” as Derrida identifies it, may not pose the career-crippling threat to academic freedom, for work not supported by the State can continue with its limited means of production, transmission and diffusion.65 Yet insofar as the State limits a wider consideration and judgment of a body of work or field of inquiry, it limits that work’s right of public engagement with the larger world of those ideas. All the more reason, then, for philosophers to do all that they can to increase opportunities for the global exchange of ideas, by speaking out, for example, on behalf of legislative initiatives such as the Federal Research Public Access Act of 2006, while increasing access to their own journals. Otherwise, they risk seeing a diminishing contribution of philosophy to the wider world of ideas, as this body of work remains relatively invisible (if secure) behind password and credit-card entry points.

Philosophy’s relative lack of visibility, compared to, say, the intervention studies on character education or middle school math curriculum packages featured on the What Works Clearinghouse site, does not bode well for the public support and trust placed in philosophy, and all that follows from that.66 Given how unlikely it is that philosophers will be able to marshal the resources needed to mount a What It Means To Say that Something “Works” in Education Clearinghouse, my suggestion is otherwise. I am proposing to readers of philosophically inclined journals such as this that they consider Derrida’s example, his principles and practices, to see how he took hold of the existing cultural machinery to organize a whole new level and means of access to philosophy, an access that asserted, above all, people’s right to philosophy in all that philosophy entails, including the necessarily difficult and challenging exercise of academic freedom.

64 Derrida, “Principle of Reason,” 144.
65 Ibid.
66 Kieran Egan addresses what is risked in the relative loss of philosophy’s presence (compared to the growing prominence of the cognitive sciences) in the course of critiquing the over-reliance on empirical research in education: “The implication is that cognitive science will now clear up what was formerly mere speculation or philosophical arguments,” Egan observes, with the result that “basic conceptual work has been avoided and left undone, and we go ahead with precisely the kinds of confusion that Wittgenstein pointed out some years ago. Methodological sophistication cannot compensate for a lack of conceptual clarity; method and problem pass one another by”; “Students’ Development in Theory and Practice: The Doubtful Role of Research,” Harvard Educational Review 75, no. 1 (2005).
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